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Introduction
This paper replicates Sims (2011) , derives the model, shows how to solve it, offers some extensions, and boils the paper down to its central ingredient.
Sims' article is important: it is a simple modern economic model that produces a temporary decline in inflation when the central bank persistently raises interest rates. Cochrane (2016) surveys the literature and finds that new-Keynesian rational expectations models predict an increase in inflation, both in the short and long run, in response to a persistent rise in interest rates. It also avoids the troublesome new-Keynesian assumption that the central bank uses a never-observed threat of instability to produce determinacy, relying on the fiscal theory of the price level instead. In old Keynesian and monetarist models, a rise in interest rates sends inflation on an unstable downward spiral, so both the short-run and long-run inflation effect is negative. However, such models rely crucially on irrational adaptive expectations, and they are inconsistent with the observed stability of inflation in the U.S. and Europe's decade, and Japan's two decades, at the zero bound.
Sims' paper is also methodologically useful. It adopts a simple, tractable continuoustime specification with sticky prices, which is a convenient framework for further exploration.
However, Sims does not state the model, he does not derive the equilibrium conditions, and he does not explain how to compute impulse-response functions. This paper fills that gap, and confirms Sims' results.
Sims also does not explore what the minimum set of ingredients is to deliver a temporary negative sign. He's after a bigger result, namely an impulse response function that delivers an entire path consistent with VAR estimates, not just the basic sign. He also does not offer much economic intuition for that sign.
I first explain the central, fiscal-theoretic, story for the temporary negative inflation effect in a frictionless models. In words, higher nominal interest rates lower the nominal value of long-term debt. If we define "monetary policy" as a change in nominal interest rates that does not affect primary surpluses, then such a change does not change the real value of primary surpluses. For a lower nominal value of nominal debt to cor-respond to an unchanged real value of primary surpluses, the price level must fall. The mechanism is simple "aggregate demand." People want more government bonds and fewer goods and services. This basic mechanism survives when the real interest rate variation of the full sticky-price model is included, and changes the real present value of unchanging surpluses.
I then derive Sims' model and explain how to solve it and calculate impulse responses. I verify Sims' calculations. I verify that the complications of Sims' model, habits, Taylor rule, and procyclical fiscal policy, do not matter for that central result.
They are useful for producing a realistic impulse-response function, and thus useful ingredients for applied modeling here, as in the standard new-Keynesian tradition such as Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005) and Smets and Wouters (2003) . For example, habits give a hump shape response. On the other hand, I show that long-term debt and an unexpected shock are crucial to the negative sign. An expected monetary policy tightening produces a rise in inflation throughout. Similarly, Sims' model with short-term debt produces an instant rise in inflation. The negative inflation response is centrally a fiscal-theoretic phenomenon.
That is, I think, the most important lesson going forward. The response to "monetary" policy -a change in interest rate target -depends crucially on the associated fiscal policy -the maturity structure of outstanding debt, and how people expect the Treasury will adjust surpluses in reaction to economic events and monetary policy actions. Furthermore, Sims' basic mechanism works in an entirely frictionless model, so has nothing to do with monetary or pricing distortions. Even the mechanism for targeting interest rates requires no monetary or pricing distortions.
Sims' negative sign does not justify conventional policy conclusions, such as the desirability of the Taylor principle, or raising interest rates to permanently lower inflation as in the 1980s. Since the short-term negative response of inflation only occurs for unexpected interest rate rises, it does not work for systematic policy, the φ π π in the Taylor rule i = φ π π + π y y. And the stepping on a rake mechanism says that as raising rates eventually raises inflation, as happened in the 1970s, so raising rates does not eventually lower inflation as occurred in the 1980s. In this framework, that permanent disinflation requires fiscal policy cooperation.
A frictionless rake
Here is how a totally frictionless model delivers the result that a rise in interest rates first causes inflation to fall, and then to rise.
Use risk-neutral valuation at a constant real factor β = 1/(1 + r). Then interest rates i t and inflation follow 1
where P t denotes the price level. A rise in nominal interest rates implies an immediate rise in expected inflation. But the price level can still jump down when interest rates increase unexpectedly.
At the beginning of period t, the government has outstanding B (t+j)
t−1 discount bonds of maturity j, each of which pays $1 at time t + j. Then, the government debt valuation equation stating that the real value of nominal government debt equals the real present value of primary surpluses is
Here, s t+j denotes the real primary surplus. The symbol Q (t+j) t denotes the time t nominal price of a j period discount bond, which pays $1 at time t + j. Q (t) t = 1 for the maturing bond j = 0. For j > 0, the bond price is, in this risk neutral constant real rate world,
Higher current or expected future interest rates lower bond prices. Now, take innovations (E t − E t−1 ) of (1). Define "monetary policy" as a change in current and expected future interest rates, and hence bond prices, that involves no change in fiscal policy, so (E t − E t−1 ) s t+j = 0. We have The mechanism is just as if the real present value of primary surpluses {s t+j } had increased. The real value of government debt is greater than its nominal value. People try to buy more government debt, and thus less goods and services. It feels like a lack of "aggregate demand." That force pushes the price level down.
In the case of one-period debt, B
(t+j) t = 0, j > 0,
so the price P t does not change unless surpluses change. Inflation rises when interest rates rise, with no price level drop. The presence of long-term debt is crucial to to the temporary price decline.
The deflationary force in this model depends entirely on how much the price of long term bonds, and thus the nominal market value of the debt, declines. Bond prices are determined by the path of expected future interest rates. Thus, in this model, the expected path of interest rates matters far more than the current rate in determining a deflationary force. Therefore, this model gives a very simple role and explanation of "forward guidance." If the central bank can make an announcement that credibly commits to higher or lower interest rates in the future, that announcement will change long-term bond prices and have an immediate inflationary or deflationary impact.
The model also suggests a restriction useful econometrically and in practice. Monetary policy actions and announcements exploit this mechanism to temporarily raise and lower inflation only and to the extent that they lower the nominal market value of government debt.
A different view of Sims' mechanism help intuition. Using the bond price from (2), we can write the government debt valuation equation (1)
By writing out the first term separately, we have before us the short-term debt case, in which the second term is absent. With one-period debt, surplus expectations drive shocks to the price level P t . With long-term debt, surplus expectations at time 0 drive the debt-weighted moving average of current and future price levels instead. Within that constraint, in the presence of long-term debt, the government can choose a different path of price levels without changing surpluses. A rise in nominal interest rates means that price levels in the far future must rise. As a result, price levels in the near future, to satisfy (4) must fall. (Cochrane (2001) To gain more intuition and connect the point to Sims' analysis, consider a very simple example: At time 0, interest rates rise unexpectedly and permanently from i t = i to
Again there is no fiscal policy shock. Inflation immediately rises to
where P * t denotes the price level after the interest rate change. But the price level P 0 may jump down.
Suppose government debt consists of nominal perpetuities, and surpluses are constant s. Now we can write B (j) −1 = B −1 , since the coupon is the same for all dates. Bond prices follow
If the price and interest rate had been expected to be P and i, giving the same relation between unstarred variables, we can divide and write
In continuous time, it's even simpler, To see how this works, consider again the case of a perpetuity and a one-time unexpected shock from i to i * at time 0. (1) is
The point is to determine P 0 in terms of predetermined B −1 and the shock to interest rates i * .
Now, consider the same equation one period in the future,
With
and (7), we have
Similarly, to support interest rates that are i t = i * further in the future,
Equation (9) can be used and interpreted in two ways. If the government sells more debt B 0 at time 0, without changing surpluses, the value of that debt declines. Selling more debt without changing surpluses is a lot like a share split, which changes the number of shares without changing dividends or earnings. Thus, by selling more debt B 0 , the government raises nominal interest rate i * , and vice versa. This is the "quantitative easing" interpretation. In QE operations, central banks bought back more long maturity debt, in a more complicated pattern, and thus lowered long-term interest rates without changing the one period rate, but the mechanism is the same.
Second, the government can target interest rates i t = i * and offer to sell as many perpetuities as people want at that price. If the government can commit to keep surpluses unchanged, equation (9) describes how many perpetuities the government will sell at the price.
This equation thus answers just how the government can implement an interest rate target, even in a completely frictionless model with no money, no reserve requirements, and so forth. One might worry, for example, that if the government announces and interest rate and says it will sell any amount of bonds at that rate, it will face a horizontal demand curve and be swamped. This equation reassures us that it will not. Cochrane (2014a) argues that this mechanism in fact can describe our current institutional arrangements in which a central bank sets an interest rate and Treasuries auction an apparently fixed number of securities.
In sum, Sims' mechanism operates even in a completely frictionless model -no monetary frictions, no pricing frictions. If interest rates rise unexpectedly, or if ex-pected future rates rise unexpectedly so that long-term bond prices fall, prices will first fall, and then rise. The crucial ingredient is outstanding long-term debt, and fiscal policy that does not fully absorb the inflationary impact of the interest rate change. The mechanism treats interest rate targets, forward guidance about future rate changes, and quantiative easing operations in the same breath. However, it only operates for unexpected interest rate changes, and it operates on the day of announcement, not on the day of interest rate change. Fully expected interest rate changes raise inflation uniformly.
Continuous time and sticky prices
Sims' analysis seems to be quite different, in that it operates in continuous time and the price level P t cannot jump. A rise in interest rates sets off a period of deflation, which cumulatively lowers the price level. However, as I show below, this apparent difference is not central. As one removes price stickiness, Sims' short period of deflation gets stronger and stronger, smoothly approaching the downward jump predicted by the frictionless model.
The continuous time setup with no price level jumps is an important framework, and works a bit differently from the discrete time model presented above. Simplifying to either a perpetuity or to instantaneous debt, the government debt valuation equation is
where Q is the bond price, B the number (face value) of bonds, P is the price level, i is the nominal interest rate, π is the inflation rate and s is the real primary surplus.
For short-term debt, Q t = 1 always. In discrete time, or if prices can jump, innovations in s τ can induce a jump in P t . That channel disappears in continuous time with sticky-price models such as Sims' that preclude price-level jumps. However, this fiscal relation can still select equilibria. For given {s t } and {i t }, this relation implies a restriction on what path {π t } may follow, and still picks a unique equilibrium {π t } from the set of multiple equilibria allowed by sticky-price models. Now, a discount rate effect must operate. If Q t , B t , and P t all cannot jump when there is a jump to information about future s τ , then the discount rates i v − π v must change. If future s decline, for example, the discount rates must also decline so that the present value is unchanged. Therefore, we anticipate that a sticky-price model with one-period debt will substitute a period of higher inflation π for the immediate jump upward P t of a frictionless model in response to a fiscal shock When the central bank raises expected interest rates {i t }, with no change in surpluses, in a model that disallows a jump in P t , the path {π t } must rise so that the present value on the right side is unchanged. The pure Fisherian result obtained in discrete time will work, π t = i t − r leaves discount rates unchanged. Models with price frictions may have more complex dynamics, trading more inflation at some dates and less at others, but the path of inflation must still produce no change in present value of the surplus.
With long-term debt, however, the nominal bond price Q t can jump down when the central bank raises interest rates. If the price level P t cannot jump, the path {π t } on the right hand side must therefore adjust, now to produce a higher real discount rate and a lower present value of surpluses. At a majority of dates on the path, π t must rise less than i t so that real discount rates rise. Relative to short-term debt, we produce a path with less inflation. Thus, the downward price jump of the frictionless model becomes a period of lower inflation when the price level cannot jump.
Sims' model
The model as presented by Sims (2011) , starting with equation (15) on p. 52, iṡ
Here I use Sims' notation, r instead of i for the nominal interest rate, ρ instead of r for the real interest rate, andτ + τ t instead of s for the real primary surplus. The other symbols are p for the log price level, c for log consumption, λ for marginal utility, b for the real value of government debt, a for the nominal perpetuity yield. I also use Sims' nonstandard notation for parameters. The last equation differs from Sims' by two typos in Sims' paper, that do not affect the calculations. Details in the derivation below.
Our goal is to calculate responses of this model to unexpected jumps in the shocks, ε mt and ε τ t .
We need to state the underlying model and derive these equilibrium conditions. We then need to linearize the model, transform the model to to dx/dt = Ax t + ε t form, and then solve it as a first order linear differential equation. We need to understand jumps and "forward -looking" equations. The impulse response functions (Sims' Figure 3 and 4) feature jumps in all variables except p t and c t . So, we have to understand how variables respond to the ε mt or ε τ t jumps, and what the rules about jumps are.
The model derived and restated
Sims' model is a perfect-foresight continuous-time model, but allowing a probabilityzero jump in some variables. (Probability zero, because otherwise risk aversion terms would show up in asset pricing formulas.)
Reordering the equations, and writing them in a more standard form,
I use differential notation dx rather than derivative notationẋ for variables that can jump.
The starred equations are "forward-looking," they specify the expectation of a forwardlooking differential. To understand the issue, consider the simplest discrete-time newKeynesian model consisting only of a Fisher equation i t = E t π t+1 and a Taylor rule
This equation is "forward-looking" like the starred equations in Sims' model. It admits multiple equilibria: Any path
with E t δ t+1 = 0 is an equilibrium. This form with an expectational shock is useful for solutions, as you don't have then to do anything special about expectations. It also helps to keep track of how δ jumps in one variable are reflected in similar jumps to other variables. Therefore, I reexpress Sims' model with such expectational shocks in the next step.
The conventional model specifies φ > 1 so the dynamics are explosive. Then the unique non-explosive equilibrium is
This solution amounts to a unique choice of δ t . This general principle applies to Sims' model: For each "forward-looking" or expectational difference equation, we need to have one explosive eigenvalue and one variable that can jump to the non-explosive saddle-path equilibrium, or equivalently one expectational error. This consideration motivates several discussions in the derivation of the models' equations.
Taylor. Equation (18) is the monetary policy rule. The nominal interest rate meanreverts, and rises with inflation and consumption growth. The rule allows a jump dε mt , which generates the monetary policy shock. By examining the steady state dr t = 0, you can see that θ > γ is the Taylor rule region in which interest rates respond more than one for one to inflation, and θ < γ is the "passive money" region.
All the variables on the right hand side of the monetary policy rule can jump, so in principle one should specify whether dr t is driven by pre-jump or post-jump values (right or left limits). But since these variables are all multiplied by dt it does not matter which one specifies. For the same reason, when there is a jump dε mt , r jumps by the same amount dr t = dε mt , even though the other variables also respond to the jump, and when there is a jump dε τ t , we still have dr t = 0 even though the variables on the right hand side may jump.
Phillips. Equation (20) and (21) define the forward-looking Phillips curve. It is the analogue of the discrete-time curve π t = αE t π t+1 + κc t which can be written in the form
from which (21) 
Sims introduces a structural shock ε rt , but he does not use it, so I leave it out.
The generic asset pricing equation for a security whose real value process is v t and hence return is dR t = dv t /v t is
where λ t is the marginal utility of consumption. Sims avoids the second risk aversion term by specifying an infinitesimal probability jump as the only source of randomness.
In the presence of a potential price level jump, the real return on the nominal short term bond is
so the risk-neutral Fisher relation is really
Replacing the term in the expectation on the left with −E t (dp t ) is a linearization or approximation.
However, while this Fisher equation and (19) allow for price-level jumps, in Sims' specification the Phillips curve does not allow for such jumps -inflation can jump, but the price level cannot jump. The Phillips curve comes from a Calvo fairy who allows a fraction (constant)dt of firms to change prices at any date. Since no mass of firms can change prices in an instant, prices cannot jump.
Without price level jumps or (diffusion terms), we can write d(1/P t )/(1/P t ) = −dp t and with (20) dp t = π t dt the Fisher equation becomes simply
I use this form below.
In sum, with no price level jumps, the Fisher equation is no longer "forward-looking."
We lose one expectational error, so we need one less an explosive eigenvalue.
Term Structure. Equation (22) is the term structure relation between long and short rates. The perpetuity has nominal yield a t , nominal price 1/a t and pays a constant coupon 1dt. Thus, the condition that the expected nominal perpetuity return should equal the riskfree nominal rate (there are no price level jumps and no risk premiums) is
Equation (22) follows. There are jumps in a t , so and thus the second equality is a linearization or approximation. The next step will be to linearize the model anyway. However, if one wishes to extend Sims' model by solving the nonlinear version, or including nonzero shock probability and hence risk premiums, one should keep the nonlinear version.
This is a forward-looking equation, so I introduce the corresponding expectational
Debt. Equations (23) and (24) describe government finances. Equation (23) describes a primary surplus that rises and falls with consumption growth, and can jump.
Equation (24) is the government budget constraint. By definition, b t ≡ B t /(a t P t ) is the real market value of government debt, where B t is the number of perpetuities outstanding and P t is the price level. Sims models the real value of government debt because the consumer's transversality condition states that this real value may not explode. That condition is a key "forward-looking" condition which forces variables to jump when shocks occur.
To derive this equation, start from the observation that the government must sell new perpetuities at price 1/a t to cover the difference between coupon payments $1×B t and primary surpluses τ t +τ , (τ is the steady state, τ t the deviation from steady state)
B t does not jump.
Now note
1/a t − b t dp t .
Here I have used the fact that there are no price level jumps. Substituting into (29), and with π t dt = dp t , and solving for db t ,
The face value of debt B t does not jump. The market value can jump, because the bond price can jump. This is an ex-post equation, restricting the actual change db t not just the expected change E t db t , so it does not require an expectational error or an extra explosive eigenvalue. (Forward differences and "forward-looking" are not the same thing.) Its jump is entirely induced by the jump in bond prices.
To connect the jump in debt to the jump in bond prices, I use the same linearization of the latter, giving (24),
In the next step, I split da t on the right hand side to
Then we can write
Consumption.
Equations (25)- (27) describe marginal utility with a "habit" term that values a smooth consumption path. The utility function adds a penalty for the derivative of log consumption growth,
To derive marginal utility, set this up as a Hamiltonian with a constraint that wealth grows at the interest rateẆ
The state variables are x t = [C t W t ] and the control variable is u t = dC t /dt. The current value Hamiltonian is then
The first order conditions are
From (33),
From (31), dropping t subscripts,
so, from (32),
Note with c = log(C),
Sims gives the corresponding equation (his equation (22)) as
The finalρċ term is missing in Sims' paper, a typo confirmed by Sims. To keep track of it I will useρ in its place, and then we can chooseρ =ρ orρ = 0. I verify that the typo does not extend to Sims' calculations. Sims includes aċ 2 term, which I believe to be a typo or algebra mistake. (It can result from omitting the second term in (32).) However
Sims' subsequent linearization procedure drops this squared term, so its inclusion or omission makes no difference to the calculations.
The marginal utility λ is as usual a forward-looking expectational equation which can both jump, and for which we have to tie down an expectational error.
The penalty on the second derivative of log consumption means that consumption cannot jump. Therefore, as with inflation, I introduce a state variableċ t of the first derivative of consumption, and specify the second-order differential equation containingc,ċ, and c as a paired first-order differential equation. Finally, the first derivative of consumption can jump, so we (34) implies a a forward-looking expectational equation,
I add a corresponding expectational error dδċ t below
Linearization
The model is now
where I have introduced the expectational errors dδ t .
Since the price level does not enter the model, I drop the definition dp t = π t dt from the model solution. We can use it later to compute the price level.
The steady state is where all time derivatives are zero. All rates of return equalρ,
I use variables without t subscripts to denote steady state values. Taxes pay for the coupons,
The Phillips curve means c = 0, and then the marginal value of wealth is one.
Linearizing around this steady state, working to dx t = Ax t dt + dε t representation, and using tilde notation for differences to the steady state for variables that are not zero at that state,r t ≡ r t −ρ
the linearized model is
Here, I used π t =r t −ρ t to eliminate the real interest rateρ t . Also, the linearization of (42) gives in fact
However, the impulse response function takes place when variables are at steady states, so I eliminate the state-dependent shock response in (55) and simplify to (51).
The model is, at last, in the standard form dx t = Ax t dt + d t .
The fiscal block (49), (50), (51) operates independently of the rest of the model -other variables enter here, but the variables a, τ, b determined here do not feed back on the rest of the system. As in other new-Keynesian models, the model without this block and passive monetary policy is indeterminate, it has multiple equilibria. But all but one of those equilibria lead to an explosive path for the real value of debt b t . Therefore, the fiscal block selects equilibria.
Solution
Expressing the model in matrix notation 
It's easiest to solve the differential equation, and then use the shocks and jumps to set up a set of initial conditions x 0 . Without the shock term, we have
where Q is a matrix of eigenvectors, and Λ a diagonal matrix of eigenvalues of A. To rule out explosions, we must have y it = 0 for each element i of y t corresponding to an explosive eigenvalue λ it ≥ 0. Since the y are linear combinations of the x, this condition imposes a set of linear restrictions on x t and x 0 in particular,
x 0 = 0
denotes the ith row of Q −1 . Thus, also,
This is a set of linear restrictions on the shocks dε 0 . In turn, this set of linear restrictions allows us to determine the expectational errors δ as a function of the underlying shocks ε. This system has four undefined expectational errors, so we need exactly four nonnegative eigenvalues for the model to be uniquely determined, which is the case.
To find the instantaneous response to the shocks, then, we must solve
1,:
Q −1 3,:
for dδ πt , dδ at , dδ λt , dδ ct where i = 1, 2, 3, 4 denotes the indices of the explosive eigenval-ues. Break up the and δ parts of the shock vector in (56) to write 
Then, we can solve (56),
Q −1 3,: 
Using (57) x 0 only for the non-positive eigenvalues j.
Finally, the impulse response function is given by y jt = e −λ jt y 0i ; x t = Qy t .
Impulse-response functions
Sims uses parameters γ = 0.5; θ = 0.4; φ = 0.75; σ = 2;ρ = 0.05;τ = 0.1; β = 0.1; δ = 0.2; ω = 1.0; ψ = 2.0. Here, θ < γ so we are in the fiscal theory of the price level region of passive monetary policy and active fiscal policy, in the Leeper (1991) categorization. Figure 1 shows the response of interest rates and inflation to the monetary policy shock. You see the jump down in inflation, followed by its slow rise. 
Habits, Taylor rules, and fiscal responses
How many of Sims' ingredients are necessary to deliver a negative response of inflation to the interest rate rise? How many ingredients are useful to match dynamics, but not essential to the basic sign?
It turns out that the habit ψ, the Taylor rule γ, φ, θ, and the fiscal policy response ω do not matter for the negative response of inflation to the interest rate rise. Figure 3 presents the impulse response function for the case γ = 0, a permanent rise in rates; φ = θ = 0, an interest rate peg that does not respond to inflation or output; ω = 0, surpluses do not respond to output; and ψ = 0, no habits. (Not shown, the limit of the response functions as ψ → 0 is well-behaved. One might worry that consumption can jump at ψ = 0 and cannot jump for any ψ > 0, no matter how small ψ. However, the fast hump-shaped responses smoothly approach a jump.) The short-run negative response of inflation to the rise in interest rates is still there, in fact stronger than ever. The same 1% nominal interest rate rise as in Figure 1 now produces a 5% fall in inflation, not an 0.1% fall, and consequently a 6% rise in the real rate of interest. This magnitude is driven by the duration of the interest rate shock, permanent in this case. The longer-lasting the shock, the greater its effect on long term bond prices.
Response to expected monetary policy
Two parts of Sims' specification are necessary for the negative sign result: that the interest rate shock is unexpected, and that debt is long term.
The top panel of Figure 4 presents the response of the full Sims model to an expected monetary policy shock. In this case, the interest rate response is fully Fisherian -inflation rises smoothly through the episode. (The shock only happens at time t = 0.
However, the endogenous responses of the interest rate rule to output and inflation mean that interest rates move a bit ahead of the shock and move more than the shock on its day.)
The bottom panel of Figure 4 plots the response of the simplified model with no
Taylor rule γ = ψ = φ = 0, no fiscal response ω = 0 and no habits ψ = 0 to a fully anticipated shock. The inflation rate rises smoothly throughout, just as in the discretetime versions of this calculation presented in Cochrane (2016) .
The negative response of inflation to an interest rate rise depends crucially on that rise being unexpected, and therefore triggering a revision in the present value of future surpluses.
Calculating the response to expected rate rises
When the monetary policy shock ε mt is expected, all the expectational errors δ t are equal to zero. That makes solving the model a lot easier. I'll posit a single jump at time 0. The system is 
dε 0 e λ i t ; t ≤ 0;
y it = 0; t > 0 λ i < 0 :
dε 0 e λ i t ; t ≥ 0;
In words, each state variable y it jumps by an amount Q −1 i,: 
Short-term debt
Long-term debt is also necessary for the negative response of inflation to interest rates. shown here for the expected case. In discrete time, the shortest bonds are one period, and unexpected inflation also implies a price level jump, which affects the real value of debt. The lesson is that predictions of this sort of model are sensitive to the maturity structure of debt, even the difference between one year and zero.
The response to an expected interest rate rise is exactly as it was with long-term debt. Long vs. short term debt affects the results only by inducing a change in the value of debt at the time of the shock.
Model with short-term debt
The maturity structure only matters to the dB t equation. To derive the db t equation in the case of short term debt, start with the definition that the real value of the debt is
Here B t is the quantity of instantaneous, i.e. floating rate debt. I do not divide by a t as the price of such debt is always one.
Then,
The flow budget constraint now states that interest must be paid from surpluses or new debt issues,
The instantaneous value of short term debt can only jump if there is a price level jump. Sims' sticky-price model rules out such jumps, so the last term is
With r t = ρ t + π t we then have
whereas with long term debt before it was
The only difference between short and long term debt in this model is that the instantaneous response of the value of debt to a yield shock is absent for short term debt.
Less price stickiness
In any model, we want to verify that the frictionless limit is sensible. Many Keynesian and new-Keynesian models blow up as one reduces frictions, though the frictionless limit point is sensible. (See Cochrane (2014b).) When the frictionless limit is wellbehaved, it is useful see whether the basic sign and mechanisms hold in the frictionless limit point, leaving frictions to fill out dynamics and magnitudes, or whether the frictions are essential to the basic point. Both properties hold here. The frictionless limit is smooth, and the central point -a temporary negative inflation response to higher interest rates -holds in the frictionless limit and frictionless model. Price stickiness, like habits, Taylor responses, and the fiscal response, is useful for producing realistic impulse-response functions, but not necessary for the basic point. Figure 7 shows the response of inflation (top) and of the price level (bottom) to the step-function interest rate rise, in the simple model, as we reduce price stickiness. In this model, larger values of δ, the coefficient on consumption in the Phillips curve (21),
correspond to less price stickiness. As δ rises, consumption varies less for a given variation in inflation; as δ → ∞, inflation is independent of consumption, which is the frictionless model.
The response of inflation at the top of Figure 7 seems worrisome: as we reduce stickiness, the negative response of inflation to interest rate rises gets bigger and bigger.
This behavior also occurs in the full Sims model. This starts to look like one of the newKeynesian model pathologies.
But disinflation gets bigger and bigger for a shorter and shorter time. When we plot the response of the price level to the interest rate shock, at the bottom of Figure 7 , a clearer picture emerges. The path of inflation approaches a 20% jump down in the price level, followed by steady inflation at the 1% higher inflation rate corresponding to the 1% higher nominal interest rate.
And that limit is also the limit point: A frictionless model with long term debt produces that result, as we saw following equation (21). 
Conclusions
If you want to understand how monetary policy appears to lower interest rates -and then often struggles with subsequent inflation -as happened in the 1970s, then Sims' model is the basis for elaboration.
It is far from a model of "monetary policy" however. All the action comes from the fiscal theory of the price level. Without a surprise, and a surprise change in the value of government debt, and unless the fiscal authorities keep surpluses constant as inflation devalues their long-term commitments, the model does not produce even the desired negative sign.
That is, however, its most important point. We are used to thinking of fiscal underpinnings as a vague requirement that government finances not go totally off kilter, and then monetary policy can do its job. No. Sims' article points that the fiscal underpinnings are central to understand the sign and dynamics of "monetary" policy.
Appendix. Solving the model without habits
To calculate the ψ = 0 limit point, in which consumption can jump, we have to solve it separately for that case, as 1/ψ terms show up in the regular model solution. For the ψ = 0 case, instead of 
we have
We linearize to dλ t = −ρ t dt + dδ λt (63)
We can eliminate λ, so we have 
8×1
Note this will produce a response to the chosen dε t shocks. The actual interest rate move will be larger.
